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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD AND THE EXISTENCE 
OF HOMER: RETHINKING THEISM AND 
REVELATORY CLAIMS 
Sandra Menssen and Thomas D. Sullivan 
Can a convincing case be made for the claim that a good God has revealed 
something to us? We are not asking whether religious belief is rational, or 
might be properly basic. We are rather asking the question the unconvinced 
demand be confronted. The standard way of arguing the affirmative creates a 
huge, unnecessary problem by tacitly presupposing that a sound case for a 
revelatory claim requires first working up a highly plausible argument for the 
existence of a good God. Once it is seen that this presupposition is false, the 
way is open to following a nonstandard philosophical path. For if facts about 
the universe yield enough evidence to show that the existence of a creator of 
some ilk is not highly implausible, it is possible that the content of a putative 
revelation might serve to close the evidential gap. And, we contend, our 
knowledge of the universe does yield the required modicum of evidence. It 
turns out, then, that !l negative conclusion about the existcllce of God is untmrranted 
unless the contellt of revelatory claims has been considered. 
I. The standard way of building a case for theism and revelatory claims: 
its rationale and its troubles. 
Has a good God given us a revelation?l Many philosophically-inclined 
nonbelievers wonder. They are not particularly interested in the rationali-
ty of the claim that God has revealed. A belief can be rational, but false. 
They want to know whether the claim is true. Nor are they engaged by the 
question of whether belief in God or some particular revelatory claim 
might be properly basic. They judge that they have no belief at all in God, 
and certainly not properly basic belief. Hopeful, often, of becoming believ-
ers, but wary of religious enthusiasms and determined to follow reason, 
such agnostics seek a philosophical case that there is a God who has commu-
nicated to us. 
Can they find a convincing case? The long tradition of natural theology 
provides an intricate tangle of arguments, elaborated over the years. The 
paths typically cut for an agnostic inquirer facing this thicket of arguments 
share an important feature. These paths tacitly presuppose: 
(P) One cannot obtain a convincing philosophical case for a revelato-
ry claim without first obtaining a highly plausible case for a good 
God. 
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On the view marked by presupposition (P), which we will call the standard2 
view, an inquirer begins by trying to establish a highly plausible case for 
the existence of a good God, a case sufficiently plausible that when the best 
argument available for the truth of some putative revelation is tacked on, 
the outcome is a case for the revelatory claim that is at least equiprobable, 
and ideally more probable than not. 
Presupposition (P) carries some intuitive appeal. And logical considera-
tions about complex questions may well appear to support (P). In general, 
it may seem, if one is trying to answer a complex question, one must first 
answer any embedded simpler questions. And it is, indeed, easy to find 
cases where it is eminently sensible to answer at least some of the sub-
questions before tackling the complex question. It is, for instance, prepos-
terous for a physician to try to decide whether a certain cancer therapy will 
benefit a patient without first getting a fairly good fix on whether the 
patient has cancer. 
Logical though it may seem, the standard approach to building a case 
for a revelatory claim routinely stymies inquirers. It is exceedingly difficult 
for many agnostics (and many theists as well) to believe that a good God 
could have created this world, with all its evils, unless there is an afterlife in 
which wrongs are righted. And in the minds of many, agnostics and the-
ists alike, arguments available through philosophy, through unaided nat-
ural reason, are insufficient to establish the existence of an afterlife of the 
right sort. Theists who accept a revelatory claim that includes a good 
God's promise of eternal salvation have resources to handle the problem of 
evil. But it looks like an agnostic cannot build a case that a revelatory claim 
is plausible without first assenting to the claim that there is a good God; 
and it looks to many agnostics like the existence of evil makes this impossi-
ble.3 And even if an agnostic can assign a fairly high probability to the 
claim that there is a good God, that is a long way from endorsing a particu-
lar revelatory claim. (Alvin Plantinga argues that even if an extremely gen-
erous estimate concerning the probability of theism is made, it will be vir-
tually impossible to move on in the standard way and push the probability 
of Christianity up above .5'< ) 
It is thus easy to despair of the standard approach. Dissatisfaction with 
it may drive theistic philosophers to seek an alternative to natural theolo-
gy, an alternative to building a reasoned case for theism and revelatory 
claims. Philosophical believers certainly do offer alternatives. Plantinga, 
for instance, defends a "testimonial" model of belief, which portrays 
Christian belief as warranted (if true); Paul Moser articulates a "filial" 
approach to knowledge of God, which he contrasts with an approach 
reliant on natural theology.5 However, such alternatives have extremely 
limited appeal to philosophically-inclined nonbelievers interested in 
exploring religion, but resolved to accept Christianity, or any revealed reli-
gion, only if there is a good case to be had for it. 
Is there an alternative to the standard approach that can engage inquir-
ing agnostics? Recall that the standard way of building a case presupposes 
(P), and that (P) enjoys an in.itial plausibility, backed by reflection on the 
problem of handling complex questions. It turns out, however, that the 
philosophical rationale supporting (P) is defective. Examples show it is a 
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mistake to think that if the truth of a complex proposition is at issue, and 
that proposition embeds sub-propositions, then each embedded sub-
proposition must first be established. 
Here is a particularly pertinent example: it is sometimes clearly reason-
able to ask whether an intelligent but nonhuman being has sent a message, 
rather than first asking whether there are any intelligent beings who are not 
human, and then asking whether such a being has sent a message. The SET! 
research program (Search for Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence) involves moni-
toring millions of radio signals from outer space. Many natural objects emit 
these signals, but SET! researchers look for signals that almost certainly 
would have to be sent by intelligent agents. Imagine that researchers dis-
cover a 1126 bit sequence corresponding to the prime numbers from 2 to 
101. The statement "Some highly intelligent life form in outer space has 
sent this signal" embeds "There is (or was) some highly intelligent life in 
outer space," but it is eminently reasonable to try to confirm the embedding 
statement in order to confirm the embedded statement. 
Perhaps it will be objected that the investigative procedures just 
described cannot be proper, not in the way we described them, because the 
procedures commit "the fallacy of the complex question." In fact, howev-
er, there is no relevant fallacy here to worry about. Yes, Aristotle talked 
about the fallacy of the complex question. And one finds it in most logic 
texts that deal with informal fallacies. But Aristotle's account is less than 
luminously clear. 6 The text-book discussions of the so-called fallacy are 
typically defective. 7 And a bit of reflection shows that for any complex 
question there is always at least one sub-question that cannot be answered 
before the complex question is answered, because there is no such thing as 
presuppositionless inquiry. Questions are always about propositions, and 
every proposition presupposes (at the very least) a domain of discourse. 
"Do unicorns exist?" will be answered in one way if the domain of dis-
course includes mental or fictional objects, in another way if these things 
are excluded from discussion. 
Since the philosophical rationale supporting (P) does not survive scruti-
ny, an agnostic inquirer might well wonder whether a nonbeliever could 
find a philosophical case for accepting at once both the claim that God 
exists and the claim that God has revealed. In subsequent sections we will 
argue that an outsider could, indeed, discover such a case. In fact, we will 
argue for the stronger thesis that a negative conclusion about the existence of 
God is unwarranted unless the content of revelatory claims has been considered. 
Before getting into details of our argument, an analogy may be useful. 
(Readers with a taste for mathematics might find the analogy helpful; oth-
ers may prefer to skip to Section II.) 
Over 2,000 years ago the Greeks worked with early forms of integral cal-
culus. Archimedes developed a method for approximately measuring the 
area of a given region by inscribing within it regions whose areas can be 
easily computed, and summing the areas of these regions. The more 
regions that are inscribed, the closer one gets to exhausting the original 
region, and the more accurate the total area measurement. Newton and 
Leibniz, taking a cue from this "method of exhaustion," developed general, 
systematic treatments of both integral and differential calculus. 
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Notoriously, though their systems were powerful in application, they had 
defective foundations. Both men (most regularly Leibniz) spoke of infinite-
ly small quantities, "infinitesimals" or "differentials." The notion had intu-
itive appeal, but as Berkeley and others showed, the formal accounts of 
infinitesimals were internally inconsistent. It was not until the 19th century 
that mathematicians such as Cauchy and Weierstrass developed the 
"epsilon-delta" concept of moving toward a limit in a way sufficiently 
clear and rigorous to ground calculus. Reference to infinitesimals became 
thoroughly disreputable. There was a cost, however, to the epsilon-delta 
approach to calculus: though precise, its proofs and manipulations are 
awkward, and it is something of a disaster pedagogically. 
In the 1960s the mathematician Abraham Robinson proposed an 
approach to calculus that he called "nonstandard analysis." Returning to 
the intuitively appealing notion of an infinitesimal, an idea that appears in 
ordinary language when, for instance, we refer to "instants" of time, 
Robinson showed it is possible to set up a rigorous, consistent framework 
of analysis which includes infinitesimals. Drawing on work in mathemati-
cal logic, Robinson showed how to extend the real number system to 
include "hyperreals" (in something like the way rational numbers were 
extended to include "reals" in order to allow 2 to have a square root). The 
hyperreals include infinitesimals. 
Nonstandard analysis is intuitively appealing to many, and further, much 
easier to learn and teach once modern mathematical logic is mastered. The 
delta-epsilon approach perfected by Weierstrass is certainly not wrong; it 
gives the right results-but for many students nonstandard analysis will be 
the pedagogically superior approach. The consensus among mathemati-
cians today is that Robinson has rehabilitated the concept of an infinitesimal. 
We will soon propose a nonstandard approach to building a philosophi-
cal case for revelatory claims, an approach that has certain advantages, just 
as in mathematics it is possible to develop a nonstandard approach to 
analysis that has its advantages. The awkward standard approach in 
analysis abandons infinitesimals (hyperreals) and pays a big price in the 
complications of its proofs. The nonstandard approach in analysis, which 
is in fact far more natural and easier to grasp, gains its advantages by 
allowing the use of hyperreals. Nonstandard analysis is in no way less rig-
orous. So too, the standard paths through natural theology, which ignore 
some elements inquirers are naturally inclined to bring into the discussion 
early on, unnecessarily complicate matters. There is no good reason for 
inquiring agnostics not to proceed in a way that many find natural, taking 
into account early the content of revelatory claims. By proceeding in this 
nonstandard but natural way, progress can be made at least equally well. 
II. Investigating the existence of Homer: 
first premise of an argument for an alternative approach. 
We here defend a claim that will serve as the first premise in our argument 
that a negative conclusion about the existence of God is unwarranted 
unless the content of revelatory claims has been considered. The claim at 
issue is this: 
RETHINKING THEISM AND REVELATORY CLAIMS 335 
(1) If the existence of some being x is problematic, but not exceeding-
ly improbable, then the question of whether x exists has not ade-
quately been considered unless communications widely alleged to 
have come from x have been considered. 
The example introduced above concerning the SET! research program pro-
vides some implicit support for this contention. But because of the claim's 
importance, we wish to offer more explicit support by developing a paral-
lel between the investigation of the existence of God and investigation of 
the existence of Homer.S 
Despite the fact that even the ancient Athenians knew almost nothing 
about the life of Homer, they seem not to have doubted that the Iliad and 
the Odyssey were both composed by a single individuaL In the 6th century 
BC stories began to arise about the heritage and personality of the man 
believed to have authored the epics, but contemporary scholars find little 
in those traditions that is plausible except for the claim that Homer was an 
Ionian associated with Smurne and Khios. 9 Much later, Cicero and 
Josephus both suggested that the niad had been composed without the aid 
of writing, but neither seems to have doubted that the composition was the 
work of a single individual.!O 
The first widespread debate about whether there actually was a single 
person responsible at least for the Iliad surfaced in the 18th century. In 1715 
a work by the Abbe d' Aubignac was published that argued that Homer 
never lived,!l and by the end of the century the powerful and influential 
work of the German scholar FA. Wolf had persuaded a large number of 
scholars that there never was a Homer, a single person who composed the 
Iliad. In developing his case Wolf relied on a newly discovered tenth-cen-
tury "Homer" manuscript with commentary going back to the 
Alexandrians, and on the sophisticated tools of Biblical scholarship being 
developed by German theologians. 
Wolf appears to argue in his grand (but unfinished) Prolegomena to 
Homerl2 that there could not have been a single individual who composed 
the Iliad, because if the Iliad had been composed by one individual that per-
son would have needed to rely on writing, and writing was not known in 
the time and place of composition of the Iliad. Now if one is convinced that 
without writing it is impossible for a poem the length of the Iliad to be 
retained in the human mind, then it is not going to matter much what the 
poem itself contains, what the internal or intrinsic evidence for a single 
author is. Bitter debate between the "analysts" (who took up the Wolfian 
argument) and the "unitarians," who disputed it on grounds of internal 
textual evidence, raged on up through the first part of the 20th century. 
But in the 1930's the field work of Milman Parry showed that there is no 
doubt that epics the length of the Iliad can be composed orally when writ-
ing is absent from a culture. Parry transcribed an epic poem of the proper 
length from a bard in southern Serbia unable to read or write. 
Subsequently, other field workers documented similar feats of memory 
(e.g. by Uzbek and Kara-kirgiz bards).B As the Oxford Classical Dictionary 
tells us: 
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The early arguments [against the existence of Homer] ... based on the 
belief that no man could have composed poems of such a length 
before writing was known, have now been dispelled by our knowl-
edge of what memory can do when writing is not familiar.14 
Given that it is not impossible, perhaps even not wildly implausible for 
a single poet to have had primary responsibility for the Iliad, scholars can 
ask: was there in fact one author? In answering this question, of course, 
the content of the poem is carefully considered. The cohesiveness of each 
poem as a whole is examined. The consistency and strength of the charac-
ters in the poem, and the development, power, and resolution of the main 
plot and of sub-themes within it is examined. The consistency and rich-
ness of the language is analyzed, and the regular appearance of certain fea-
tures of vocabulary (including particular abstract nouns, Aeolic forms, and 
patronymics) studied. Types and number of similes and types of transi-
tions used between major scenes are evaluated. The current consensus of 
opinion among the classicists seems to be that it is more likely than not that 
Homer did actually exist: 
Most scholars now accept that the Homeric epics are the result of a 
developing oral epic tradition on the one hand, the unifying and cre-
ative work of an exceptional monumental composer on the other. IS 
How does all this bear on investigating theism and revelatory claims? It 
yields a central principle. The classicist begins reflection on the question of 
authorship of the Iliad conscious of a serious problem for anyone who says 
there was a single or principal author: absent writing, it is not clear the 
human mind is capable of the task of composition. Learning the feats of 
memory illiterate peoples accomplish clarifies things. It may not fully 
establish that a principal author could have composed the great poem: 
perhaps, for instance, the poem contains what seem to be eye-witness 
accounts of landmarks no single individual could have visited at the time 
(dealing with this problem would require arguing that the accounts are not 
eye-witness accounts, or that they were initially, but could have been 
woven into the Iliad by a principal author, or something of the sort). But 
fully establishing that a principal author could have composed the great 
poem is not necessary in order for a classicist to be motivated to undertake 
further inquiry about Homer, motivated to study the contents of the Iliad 
with the question of authorship in mind. Now it may seem that the most 
we can get out of reflection on the case of Homer is merely an analogy that 
allows us to gesture towards an approach for the investigation of the exis-
tence of God and the truth of revelatory claims. But it would be a mistake 
to see the case of Homer in this way, because we can get a generalization 
out of this case, and (eventually) deduce from the generalization. The gen-
eral principle the Homer example establishes is this: If the existence of some 
being x is problematic, but not exceedingly improbable, then the question of 
whether x exists has not adequately been considered unless communications widely 
alleged to have come from x have been considered. 
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III. Reflecting on the likelihood of an originator: 
second premise of an argument for an alternative approach. 
This brings us to the second premise: 
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(2) While the existence of an originator is problematic, it is not 
exceedingly improbable. 
We understand an originator to be a cause of the universe--more specifi-
cally, a certain sort of necessary condition of the existence of the universe. 
As we use the term, "originator" does not even imply intellect. 
Nevertheless, to show that the existence of an originator is not highly 
implausible, not exceedingly unlikely or improbable, may in one sense be to 
show that God's existence is not highly implausible. For if in fact God-
the traditional God, the God not only of the philosophers but of Abraham, 
Isaac, and Jacob-does exist, a proof of an originator may be a proof of 
God in the sense that a proof of the existence of an electron is the proof of 
the existence of something with a charge of 1.6021-19 C. One might establish 
that the existence of an originator is not highly unlikely without claiming 
that the hypothesis that there is an originator is explanatory in some rich 
sense. One might establish that an originator is not highly unlikely with-
out saying a word about how the originator originates, without giving any 
details about how the universe is caused. And one might establish that an 
originator is not highly unlikely without saying a word about other attrib-
utes the originator may have. 
It can, in fact, be shown-with surprisingly little effort-that the exis-
tence of an originator is not highly unlikely. All we need do is show that 
the conjunction of three quite appealing propositions is not highly improb-
able. The three, which we wi111ist in a moment, are familiar small frag-
ments of certain versions of the Kalam argument. But the use we make of 
them is unusual. Kalam arguments aim to establish that there is a creator. 
In keeping with our over-all strategy, we aim only to establish that the 
existence of a creator or originator is not highly unlikely. Therefore, we 
need not insist that each of the three propositions is true, or even highly 
probable; we need only show that the conjunction is not highly improba-
ble. Here are the propositions: 
(A) The physical universe came to be (that is, had a beginning).16 
(B) Whatever comes to be has a cause (a certain sort of necessary con-
dition). 
(C) Nothing causes itself to come to be. 
If on some sensible reading of each proposition the conjunction of the three 
is not highly implausible, then it is not highly implausible that the universe 
has a cause distinct from itself, an originator. For all the argument tells us, 
there may be more than one cause of the universe, more than one origina-
tor: to say that there is a being causally responsible for the existence of the 
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universe is not to say there is only one such being.'7 But if the argument is 
correct, it cannot be claimed that it is known or all but known that there is 
no creator. 
Why think that the world came to be? Even many nontheists these days 
have been persuaded that the claim is true, given the theory that the world 
began from an initial singularity. The preponderance of opinion among 
contemporary cosmologists seems to be that the world did not always 
exist, that there was an initial singularity out of which the world devel-
oped. On this basis alone it looks like we can assign the claim that "the 
world came to be" a probability of at least.5. How are we to assess the 
probability of (8), that whatever comes to be has a cause (a certain sort of 
necessary condition)? There was a time when this universal causal princi-
ple seemed obvious to virtually everyone. Since Hume, the claim no 
longer strikes philosophers as obviously true. On the other hand, it does 
not strike them as obviously false, either. Though we think the principle is 
highly likely, let us cautiously assign it a probability (roughly) of merely .5. 
What about (C)? Quentin Smith offers three arguments intended to open 
up the possibility that the universe created itself.]S But we can put them to 
one side here, because they have no impact on the position we are taking. 
Even if for the sake of discussion every point in all three of Smith's argu-
ments is conceded, all that follows is that it is possible that the world caused 
itself. Smith insists that the atheist's position cannot be dismissed out of 
hand. But neither can the theist's. We have good reason to think the exis-
tence of a creator, an originator, is more than a remote possibility. 
We want to emphasize how conservative our estimates concerning the 
likelihood of an originator are. We have said that each of the three premis-
es just discussed is at least equiprobable with its contradictory. But at least 
two of the propositions would be assigned a higher probability by most 
people: proposition (B) is often taken to be self-evident, and (C) is scarcely 
ever denied, even by atheists. The conjunction of the three propositions 
may have a probability considerably higher than .125. 
IV. Drawing conclusions: the alternative approach. 
So we now have at our disposal the general principle established by the 
Homer example, and we have a key claim concerning an originator. We 
are equipped to mount the following argument: 
(1) If the existence of some being x is problematic, but not exceed-
ingly improbable, then the question of whether x exists has not ade-
quately been considered unless communications widely alleged to 
have come from x have been considered. 
(2) While the existence of an originator is problematic, it is not 
exceedingly improbable. 
(3) If the question of whether an originator exists has not adequate-
ly been considered unless communications widely alleged to have 
come from the originator have been considered, then the question of 
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whether God exists has not adequately been considered unless the 
content of some major revelatory claims has been considered. 
(4) So the question of whether God exists has not adequately been 
considered unless the content of some major revelatory claims has 
been considered. 
The first two premises of this argument, of course, have been established in 
the preceding two sections. 
It should not take much work to see that premise (3) is true. The 
requirement that one must take into account the content of putative com-
munications in order to investigate the existence of a mere originator is, 
indeed, surprising. But once that point is recognized, (3) should be easy to 
accept. If one must look at the content of putative communications even to 
establish the existence of a bare originator, apart from the originator's 
properties, then a fortiori it is important to look at putative communications 
if one is interested in whether the originator might have a property such as 
goodness. 
The point may be illustrated by recalling our example involving SETI, 
the Search for Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence. Examining potential commu-
nications from possibly-existing alien beings helps us judge whether aliens 
do actually exist. If we decide that there is a good chance alien minds are 
out there, we will want to know something about the characteristics of 
those intelligences-how smart they are, how good they are, and so on. 
And to acquire information about these matters we surely will look very 
closely indeed at messages purporting to come from them. 
Obviously, too, anyone interested in determining something about the 
character of Homer will consult the contents of works he is alleged to have 
produced. If the question of whether a single author of the Iliad existed has 
not adequately been considered unless communications alleged to have 
come from the author have been examined, then a fortiori the question of 
whether a single virtuous and praiseworthy author of the Iliad existed has 
not adequately been considered unless the content of the author's putative 
communications have been studied. 
V. An objection to the alternative approach: handling the problem of evil. 
In setting out the inadequacies of the standard philosophical approach to 
investigating revelatory claims we emphasized the seriousness of the prob-
lem of evil. Yet our defense of an alternative, nonstandard approach has 
said little about how the agnostic is to handle that problem. It may be 
objected that the nonstandard approach fails to present a solution to the 
problem of evil. 
Notice, however, that the agnostic need not judge that there is a solution 
to the problem of evil to proceed with inquiry into the content of revelatory 
claims; what is needed is recognition that there may be revelatory claims 
that, if true, provide a satisfactory account of evil. A satisfactory accOlmt 
(we have maintained) will include reference to other-worldly goods. What 
else will it include? It is hard to say at the outset. It is easy enough to 
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imagine accounts that clearly would not be satisfactory. It will not do, for 
instance, to be told that the creator plays with human beings as a small, 
malicious child plays with animals, at whim subjecting them to cruel tor-
tures. This tale, even if true, is wholly unsatisfactory for an agnostic seek-
ing evidence of a good God. 
An account of evil might be both acceptable and incomplete. If a good 
friend misses an appointment with you, and says that he could not make 
the appointment because an important but confidential matter came up, 
you presumably will accept your friend's remarks as a satisfactory expla-
nation of the missed meeting, though it is obviously incomplete. 
Christianity purports to give an acceptable, though incomplete, account of 
evil. One who investigates a Christian revelatory claim should not expect 
the veil to lift completely-at least not in this lifetime. Some obscurity in 
explanation may be necessary because depth is necessary, and obscurity 
attends depth. What the agnostic investigator needs to ask is not whether 
the Christian account of evil is in all details complete, but rather whether 
the account, if truc, would be acceptable. 
One sort of evil that a revelatory claim fitting for the human condition 
might not address in any detail is animal suffering (or at least the suffering 
of nonhuman animals). A revelation that tells us what we need to know 
and do to be saved may in all sorts of ways fall short of being an exhaus-
tive account of evil: highly technical accounts of natural laws involving 
animal suffering may easily be omitted. That is consistent with the revela-
tion meeting our deepest needs, and giving a satisfactory account of evil. 
Explanations in the sciences, after all, almost always butt up against some 
fact that cannot be accounted for: there were objections to Galileo's theory 
that could not be answered (in Galileo's day, anyway), but that did not 
show Galileo's explanatory account was incorrect or unsatisfactory. 
Interestingly, many theists and atheists agree that if there is a perfectly 
good God it is not unreasonable for us to expect some kind of communica-
tion from that God. Richard Swinburne, for instance, develops the argu-
ment that "if there is a God there is good a priori reason for expecting a 
propositional revelation."19 And J.L. Schellenberg presents an argument 
pointing towards atheism for the claim that if there were a God, his exis-
tence would be obvious, and reasonable nonbelief would not be an option 
(in fact, Schellenberg suggests, nonbelief is a reasonable option).20 But the 
arguments Swinburne and Schellenberg set forth actually do not depend 
on there being a perfcctly good God: a "basically" good god, a minimally 
decent god, would do. No human parents are perfectly good parents, but 
virtually all human parents are good enough that they would seek to 
establish communication with their children if the children were separated 
from them and the children could not by themselves close the gap. 
It may be pointed out that standard treatments of the problem of evil-
treatments belonging to the mainstream approach to natural theology, and 
included in the paths typically recommended to agnostic inquirers-often 
appeal to an afterlife as a possible justifying reason for God's permitting 
evil. Is the approach we are recommending really all that different from 
the standard approach? We think that it is. Standardly, the possibility of 
life after death is regarded as a mere logical possibility. Particular revelato-
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ry claims that there is life after death are not considered in any detail. Thus 
one obtains nothing like the whole picture. The standard paths ignore 
(until very late in the game) enigmatic but arresting assertions such as St. 
Paul's claim that by his suffering he makes up what is lacking in the suffer-
ings of Christ. Furthermore, the pronouncements of some religious groups 
that the doctrine of life after death has been revealed is not engaged in the 
standard treatments. But it is only by examining the claim that the doc-
trine has been revealed that one can assess evidence concerning the devel-
opment of doctrine over time, within a particular community. 
VI. An objection to the alternative approach: 
the alleged difficulty of investigating revelatory claims. 
A critic may at this point object that evaluating the contents of revelatory 
claims is impossibly difficult, at least for an agnostic inquirer. Many ques-
tions arise. What is the criterion for individuating revelatory claims? How 
should an inquirer choose one or more claims for investigation? What 
guidelines should be used in assessing the various claims? 
These are serious questions. But several considerations blunt the objec-
tion. First, if the intricacy or multitude of revelatory claims completely pre-
vented investigation, then the claims could not sensibly be dismissed out of 
hand, as some critics are inclined to do. Second, an agnostic interested in 
revelatory claims at some point will end up exploring them if the standard 
ordering protocol for investigation is pursued, the protocol that accepts 
presupposition (P), assuming the inquiry is not abandoned (that is rather a 
large assumption, we have suggested). The question is not whether, but 
when, the claims will be investigated. Third, an agnostic investigator who 
is interested in the truth of a revelatory claim will, in the end, have to make 
an "all things considered" judgment. And the things to be considered 
include not only the difficulty in investigating revelatory claims, but plenty 
of difficulties on the other side (such as problems in making sense of a 
thoroughly materialistic world-view). Fourth, it is, in fact, manifestly pos-
sible for nonbelievers to evaluate (fairly early in the game) the truth of at 
least some revelatory claims without expert application of the tools of his-
torians and scripture scholars. 
That fourth point needs some explanation. How is an inquirer 
untrained in scripture scholarship, an agnostic, supposed to evaluate the 
contents of a revelatory claim? 
What agnostics typically will reflect on when investigating revelatory 
claims are reports concerning revelatory claims. Such reports contain dual 
intermediaries: an individual (one intermediary) makes a report; the 
report states that God has revealed to an intermediary (who mayor may 
not be identical with the reporter). It may be natural for Christian believ-
ers to skip over both sorts of intermediaries, but it is not at all natural for 
an agnostic to do so: what agnostics actually encounter are claims human 
beings make, and it is impossible for an agnostic to forget that fact. 
Revelatory claims are asserted by fallible, limited, all-too-human beings 
with their share of vices and psychological difficulties. 
We understand a report of a revelatory claim to have the form: 
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S asserts that R revealed that p to T. 
S will be an individual or a group of individuals. R will be a super-natural 
(extra-cosmic) revealer. p will be a proposition. And T will be an individ-
ual or a group of individuals. A revelatory claim (rather than a report of 
such a claim) takes the form: 
R revealed that p to T. 
The following are examples of reports of revelatory claims. Embedded in 
the reports are revelatory claims themselves. 
The Ayatollahs assert that God revealed that the Quran contains God's 
will for all the world to Muhammad. 
The authors of the Catholic Catechism assert that God revealed that the 
Roman Catlzolic Church is the oracle of God to the Roman Catholic Churclz. 
My great-allnt asserts that God revealed that only Caucasians will have a 
place in heaven to her next-door neighbor. 
The notion of a report of a revelatory claim can be sharpened in various 
ways. One might, for instance, require that a specific revelatory claim give 
some indication of the means of the revelation-maybe it came through a 
dream, or a vision, or a voice. One might require that the time of S's asser-
tion, or of R's alleged communication, be indexed. But it is a mistake to 
think we are not entitled to use a concept for the purposes of inference 
until we can offer a full definition. In order to explain that a spoon is mov-
ing across the table because someone is pulling it with a nearly invisible 
thread, one need not first define motion-in fact, motion is taken as an 
undefined primitive concept by physicists. Similarly, we do not need a 
completely precise account of a revelatory claim in order to make use of 
the concept. If the project at hand requires it, the account can be detailed. 
How is an agnostic to evaluate the contents of a revelatory claim? One 
may begin by asking, in Newman's words, whether the contents are "what 
divine goodness would vouchsafe, did it vouchsafe anything." Does the 
alleged revelation provide moral guidance? Is it noble and elevated and 
illuminating? Does it satisfy spiritual hunger and heal the deepest of 
human wounds? Does it offer a satisfactory (though possibly incomplete) 
account of evil? The questions are not easy to answer. But that is no rea-
son for leaving them out of the picture altogether. One cannot ignore data 
about whether a revelatory claim is fitting for the human condition and say 
that one has looked at the total evidential base. 
Questions beyond those concerning fittingness can and should be raised 
in evaluating the content of a revelatory claim. Is the content original? Is 
the content of the revelatory claim consistent with what we know about 
history and science-is it free from error on these matters (at least in those 
instances where it promises to be free from error)? What are the metaphys-
ical presuppositions of the revelation at issue-is the content of the revela-
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tory claim consistent with philosophical knowledge? Is the claim self-con-
sistent? Is the doctrinal content of the putative revelation strikingly devel-
oped over time, developed in a way that suggests providential guidance 
through the ages? 
Questions concerning the fittingness of a revelatory claim or its original-
ity or development may seem very subjective. But subjective judgments 
occur in every field. Consider the physicist's judgment that there is a "seri-
ous lack of agreement" between a body of data on certain spin variables, P 
and Q, and the values a particular theory predicts: 
Theoretical values of the desired parameters, in this case P and Q, are 
calculated using one or more standard models. The data points are 
plotted on the same graph with "error bars" representing the expect-
ed statistical variation in the data. 
But there is no exactitude about handling the data: 
One then visually compares the theoretical curves with the data points 
and judges whether the fit is "extraordinarily good," "very good," 
"good," "reasonably good," "lacking in agreement" "seriously lack-
ing in agreement," and so on .... 21 
The judgment about fit is not formed by applying any sort of algorithm; 
the judgment is subjective. Now we do not pretend that investigating a 
revelatory claim for fit with the human condition, or judging whether the 
development of some revelatory claim displays Newman's "chronic 
vigor," is just like doing nuclear physics. But when one asks whether the 
content of some claim is "what divine goodness would vouchsafe," or 
whether it has displayed a striking staying power over the years, one is 
posing questions recognizably similar to ones asked by physicists and 
other scientists. 
It is worth noting that the path standardly recommended for those who 
want philosophically to assess the truth of a revelatory claim-particularly 
the Christian claim-requires judging the legitimacy of putative miracles 
prior to investigating the contents of putative revelations. Locke and 
Swinburne are paradigmatic representatives of the standard attitude 
towards assessing putative miracles. Both argue that in order to accept 
Christianity we need to discover a validating miracle (such as the resurrec-
tion).22 Most agnostics, however, will be hard pressed to follow the strate-
gy of first deciding that it is probable Christ was resurrected, and then 
going on to examine other details of Christian revelatory claims. 
Since Locke and Swinburne have already argued that it is at least proba-
ble there is a good God by the time they get to evaluation of revelatory 
claims, it is surprising that they both require a validating miracle for 
believing Christian claims. Suppose you have no doubts that your college 
has a dean. Someone says "there is a shocking e-mail out from the dean." 
Your natural response is to believe that the dean did in fact send an e-mail, 
and probably, further, that it is at least mildly surprising. You certainly do 
not think you first must investigate whether your college still has a dean 
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before you judge how likely it is that the dean sent out an e-mail. If there is 
a creator, it is not bizarre to think it would communicate to creatures. One 
can imagine all sorts of nonmiraculous evidences of a divine communica-
tion given that the existence of a divine being is not highly unlikely. 
In any event, the standard approach to building a philosophical case for 
revelatory claims requires difficult judgments relatively early about the 
plausibility of miracle claims. Though investigation of the content of reve-
latory claims will not be trouble-free, it may be easier for the inquiring 
agnostic and more appealing than evaluation of miracle-claims. 
It is worth noting, finally, that even if an agnostic thought it unlikely 
that examining the contents of revelatory claims would yield a positive 
pay-off, the examination might be worthwhile. Imagine you are in an 
abandoned mine, a mine nobody knows you have entered, and are sud-
denly shut off from the entrance by the collapse of the ceilings both in front 
of and behind you. It seems pretty clear to you that the oxygen left will last 
only a short time. As you search in the dark for a way out, you se~r 
think you see-the faintest line of light passing through what may be a 
thin passage leading up and out. And you hear-or think you hear-a 
voice above calling down to you. The climb will be difficult, and you have 
no proof that it will get you into the open air. But it is hardly foolish to 
begin climbing. 
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NOTES 
1. For a more detailed presentation of the argument in this paper, see The 
Agnostic Inquirer: Rethinking the Question of Revelation, Sandra Menssen and 
Thomas D. Sullivan, forthcoming from Ashgate Publishing. 
2. The presupposition marking the standard approach is very common. 
To begin to get a sense of the breadth and depth of the presupposition consider 
(a) the order of topics typically addressed in philosophy of religion antholo-
gies; (b) Scott McDonald's account of the order of topics in his entry on "natur-
al theology" in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy; (c) the sequencing of 
Richard Swinburne's cumulative-case argument for Christianity; and (d) Alvin 
Plantinga's account of sequence in the "Enlightenment model" for investigat-
ing religious belief (Warranted Christian Belief, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000, pp. 266 - 280). 
This is not to say presupposition (P) is highlighted in accounts of the 
standard approach. It is not. Nor is the presupposition challenged, so far as 
we can see, by any of the people we have just mentioned. What some do ques-
tion is the very need for an argument. 
Though presupposition (P) is frequently found in works in natural the-
ology, we do not suggest that natural theology cannot be done without adher-
ing to (P). Indeed, we take our own work in this essay, work consisting in part 
of an attack on (P), to be work in natural theology. That is to say, we build philo-
sophical arguments, arguments whose premises do not appeal to the authority 
of putative revelations. 
3. Theists accustomed to the skillful defenses made by Plantinga, 
Swinburne, and others may think that agnostics are over-anxious about the 
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problem of evil. But they surely are not. It is interesting to note the shift in 
Swinburne's own position on the need to refer to an afterlife to handle the 
problem of evil. In The Existence of Cod he presented a theodicy that made no 
reference to the possibility of an afterlife. An inquirer might, Swinburne noted, 
try to bring in the possibility by appealing to Christian doctrine in the early 
stages of investigation. But Swinburne rejected this move on the grounds that 
if the hypothesis of an afterlife is added into the theistic hypothesis, the 
hypothesis becomes more complicated, and hence has a lower prior probability 
(pp. 221-222). Once an inquirer has worked through Christian doctrine, 
Swinburne said, the inquirer can go back over the equations, and come to a 
fuller understanding of divine goodness. But lots of people-lots of agnos-
tics-will have been stopped short long before reaching the point at which 
Swinburne urges investigation of Christian doctrine, stopped by the order of 
inquiry Swinburne used and apparently recommended. 
In a more recent work, Providence and the Problem of Evil, Swinburne says 
that he is not certain the order of inquiry he earlier recommended will be satis-
factory for an agnostic inquirer (he doesn't explicitly refer to agnostics, but one 
may draw the inference). He writes (p. x): 
But, while continuing to endorse the general approach of that book [The 
Existence of Cod], I have come to believe subsequently that theodicy is a 
considerably more difficult enterprise than I represented it there .... I 
assumed in that book that theodicy does not need to bring in doctrines 
peculiar to different religions (such as reincarnation in Eastern religions; 
or life after death in a new world etc. in Christianity), in order to show 
that the occurrence of evil does not cmmt against the existence of God. I 
am not fully convinced about that any more. 
The theodicy Swinburne goes on to set out explicitly appeals to "the whole 
Christian doctrinal package taken together." Missing is any account of how 
the skeptical agnostic inquirer can be motivated to examine that doctrinal 
package, given the lack of an argument establishing a probable case for the 
existence of God. (Swinburne's argument in The Existence of God that there is a 
probable case for God's existence depended on the theodicy he expresses 
doubts about in Providence and the Problem of Evil.) 
4. Plantinga, Warranted Christian f3elief, p. 280. We cannot entirely concur 
with Plantinga on this point. In the course of the present essay we argue that 
even if a low probability is initially assigned to the likelihood that a creator 
exists, it may well be possible to bring the probability up above .5 through 
philosophical investigation of the content of revelatory claims. 
5. Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief; Paul Moser, "Divine Hiding" and 
"A God Who Hides and Seeks," Philosophia Christi, Series 2, 3:1, 200l. 
6. See Ch. 5 of On Sophistical Refutations. Aristotle's main idea seems to be 
that we fall victim to the fallacy if we fail to detect that a question seemingly 
one really involves several questions, and either proceed to answer with a "yes" 
or a "no" in a way bound to be misleading, or freeze and fail to answer at all. 
A familiar example (though not Aristotle's) is presented by the question "Have 
you stopped beating your spouse?" No fallacy is committed, however, if one 
simply distinguishes the questions at issue, and explains one's answer. There 
is a truthful answer a nonabusive spouse can give to the question "Have you 
stopped beating your spouse?" The answer is: "No--I have not stopped beat-
ing my spouse, because to stop something you must have been doing it at 
some point, and I never have beaten my spouse." 
7. The definitions of "the fallacy of the complex question" provided by 
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most logic texts are vague and ill-formed. Irving Copi and Carl Cohen define 
the fallacy as: 
asking a question in such a way as to presuppose the truth of some con-
clusion buried in that question (Introduction to Logic, 10th ed. (New York: 
Macmillan), p. 183). 
But this formulation has us mark innumerable perfectly reasonable ques-
tions as fallacious. "Will you pick Sarah up after her classes end today?" pre-
supposes that you exist, and Sarah exists, and Sarah is female, and she has 
more than one class, and she has more than one class today, and the classes 
will end today rather than extend past midnight. 
8. We thank Professor Jeremiah Reedy of the Classics Department at 
Macalester College for helpful comments about the history of scholarship on 
Homer. 
9. G.5. Kirk, The Iliad: A Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985), p. 1. 
10. F.A. Wolf, Prolegomena to Homer, orig. publ. 1795, trans., intro., notes by 
Anthony Grafton, Glenn W. Most, James E.G. Zetzel (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1985), p. 5. 
11. See Joachim Latacz, Homer: His Art and His World, trans. James P. 
Holoka (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996), pp. 7 - 8. 
12. Wolf, Prolegomena to Homer. 
13. "Heroic Poetry," Britannica Online, accessed 05 August 1998. <http: / / 
www.eb.com:180/ cgi-bin/ g?DocF=micro/268 /58.html> 
14. Oxford Classical Dictionary, 2nd Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1970), p. 524. 
15. Kirk, p. xv. Some classical scholars (at this point in time apparently a 
minority) are now arguing there is decent reason to think Homer did have 
access to writing after all: as the so-called Dark Ages of ancient Greece are illu-
minated by modern archeology and history and philology some classicists 
have become convinced that significant aspects of the old Mycenaean aristo-
cratic culture survived the "catastrophic event" (whatever it was) of about 1200 
BC that was once thought to have extinguished Mycenaean civilization. But 
whether Homer did or did not read and write does not affect the legitimacy of 
the reasoning of the novice classicist. 
16. By "universe" we mean this universe, a space that includes all matter and 
energy, and nothing beyond that space. (Some theorists have proposed that this 
universe is not alone, that there are alternate universes to the one we inhabit, 
entirely unconnected to ours.) The universe is commonly thought to proceed 
from a singularity, and the singularity commonly thought to be a physical reality 
such as gravity, mass, or charge, that has an apparent value of infinity. The con-
cept of a singularity as applied to the entity appearing before the big bang is con-
troversial within science, but these controversies can be ignored here. Details 
concerning alternative understandings of the universe's beginnings do not affect 
our argument, so long as it is understood that we are not claiming the world 
came to be in the course of an already-existing time. 
17. Thus when we speak of "the originator" we will not mean "the one and 
only originator or cause." Rather, we mean "either the one and only origina-
tor, or one of the originators." 
18. See Quentin Smith, "The Reason the Universe Exists is that it Caused 
Itself to Exist," Philosophy 74 (1999), pp. 579 - 586. 
19. Richard Swinburne, Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 83; the argument stretches through chapter five 
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of the book. 
20. J.L. Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1993). 
21. Ronald N. Giere, Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 190. 
22. In one way, the requirement of a miracle might be seen as an incidental 
feature of Swinburne's approach to revelation; at times he seems to allow the 
theoretical possibility that the content of a revelatory claim might suffice. But 
in fact, he asserts, none of the major revelatory traditions contains a content 
that suffices for credibility. 
The problem faced by the inquirer following Swinburne's approach is exac-
erbated by his views on how one identifies the repository of true revelation. 
Swinburne wants to rely exclusively on evidence about early church history in 
judging whether there was a resurrection, because he wants to pin down a val-
idating miracle and identify the "original" revelation before identifying the 
church or tradition that is today the oracle of God. Once the original revelation 
is identified, he thinks, one is positioned to ask which among the later institu-
tions or churches is the "closest continuer" of the group receiving the original 
revelation. But one needs maybe a .4 or .5 or .6 probability that the resurrec-
tion occurred given the evidence about early history if one is going to get what 
counts as a substantiating miracle. Few agnostics are able to accept such an 
estimate. With an enhanced base that includes a long tradition of developing 
doctrine, it might be reasonable for one to believe Jesus was resurrected because 
one believes that a particular community has received the fullness of divine 
revelation, and this community proclaims the resurrection. 
